



# ACSMUNC V

HCC: Historical Crisis Committee

**Chairs:**

Adrian Doerfler

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## **Letter from the Chairs:**

Dear Delegates,

It is our pleasure to extend a warm welcome to the Historical Crisis Committee of the fifth edition of the Model United Nations Conference at the American College of Sofia.

We would like to express our gratitude to each of you for your dedication and commitment to making this conference possible. Your enthusiasm for international affairs is truly commendable, and we are excited to embark on this journey together.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967, also known as the Six-Day War, is a pivotal event in 20th-century history that continues to shape geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East and beyond. As HCC Delegates, you will have the opportunity to delve into the complexities of this conflict and explore its multifaceted implications, all while adhering to a set of rules and procedures designed to facilitate constructive debate and collaboration. Please familiarize yourself with these guidelines to ensure a smooth and productive experience for all participants.

Our committee will focus on addressing key issues and decisions relevant to the war, including military strategy, diplomatic negotiations, and humanitarian efforts. Therefore, we encourage you to conduct thorough research and prepare comprehensive strategies to effectively represent your assigned roles.

Should you have any questions or require additional assistance, feel free to contact us. We are here to support you throughout the conference and ensure that you have a rewarding experience. In closing, we look forward to witnessing your creativity, diplomacy, and critical thinking skills in action. Let us work together to tackle the challenges of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and chart a path towards peace and reconciliation.

With great anticipation,

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# Background on The Six-Day War (1967)

## Overview

### *Historical Background Up Until The War's Outbreak*

The roots of the Six-Day War lie in the unresolved tensions following the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. After Israel's victory in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (the Nakba, or *catastrophe*, for Palestinians), armistice agreements were signed in 1949, creating temporary borders (the "Green Line") but no formal peace. The status of Palestinian refugees, Israeli security concerns, and Arab states' rejection of Israel's existence fueled ongoing hostilities.

In the 1950s–60s, regional dynamics were shaped by Cold War rivalries. Egypt, under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged as a leader of Pan-Arabism and non-alignment, receiving Soviet military and economic aid. Israel, meanwhile, aligned with Western powers, particularly the United States, which supplied advanced weapons. The 1956 Suez Crisis—when Israel, Britain, and France invaded Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal—ended with international pressure forcing a withdrawal but left regional grievances unresolved.

By the mid-1960s, tensions escalated. Nasser's Pan-Arab rhetoric, combined with Syrian-Egyptian defense pacts (1966), heightened Israeli fears of encirclement. Syria, ruled by a radical Ba'athist regime, sponsored Palestinian guerrilla raids into Israel from the Golan Heights, while Israel retaliated with disproportionate force. Jordan, under King Hussein, struggled to balance its alliance with the West and domestic pressure to support Palestinian rights.

A critical flashpoint was the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964 under Arab League auspices, which launched cross-border attacks. In November 1966, an Israeli strike on the Jordanian village of Samu—a response to PLO raids—exposed Arab military weaknesses and strained Jordan-Egypt relations. Meanwhile, Soviet intelligence falsely warned Egypt in May 1967 that Israel was massing troops to attack Syria, prompting Nasser to mobilize Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula.

Nasser's actions triggered a chain reaction. On May 16, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed in Sinai since 1957, which had acted as a buffer. On May 22, Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, a move Israel deemed a *casus belli*. Jordan and Syria signed defense pacts with Egypt, and

Arab leaders vowed to “erase Israel.” By June, Arab armies had mobilized over 250,000 troops along Israel’s borders.

Israel, perceiving an existential threat, considered a preemptive strike. Despite its smaller population, Israel’s military (IDF) was highly trained and technologically superior. U.S. and Soviet attempts to de-escalate failed.

### ***The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: From the Outbreak (June 5) Until the Jordanian Forces were Ordered to Retreat from the West Bank (June 6)***

#### **June 5, 1967: Initiation of Hostilities**

- **Operation Focus:** At 7:45 AM, Israel launched Operation Focus, a preemptive aerial assault on 11 Egyptian air bases in response to Egypt’s military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula, its blockade of the Straits of Tiran, and its growing alliances with Syria and Jordan, all of which heightened Israeli fears of an imminent attack. This meticulously planned operation resulted in the destruction of approximately 197 Egyptian aircraft, effectively neutralizing about 90% Egypt's air capabilities.
- **Jordan's Engagement:** Despite Israeli appeals for neutrality, Jordan initiated military actions by shelling West Jerusalem and other Israeli locales. Jordanian forces also captured the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem and encircled Israeli positions on Mount Scopus. Concurrently, the Royal Jordanian Air Force launched sorties against Israeli targets.
- **Syria's Attacks from the Golan Heights:** As the war began, Syrian forces heavily shelled Israeli settlements in northern Israel, including Kibbutz Dan, Tel Katzir, and Ein Gev, from their fortified positions on the Golan Heights. Additionally, the Syrian Air Force launched air raids on Israeli targets, but most of its aircraft were intercepted and destroyed by the Israeli Air Force.

#### **June 6, 1967: Escalation and Territorial Advances**

- **Battle of Ammunition Hill:** Fierce combat ensued as Israeli paratroopers aimed to secure the strategic Ammunition Hill (in Jordan’s possession), a critical point for accessing Mount Scopus and relieving besieged Israeli units. The battle was intense, with significant casualties on both sides, but ultimately resulted in Israeli forces gaining control.

- **Encirclement of East Jerusalem:** Israeli units maneuvered to encircle East Jerusalem, capturing strategic locations such as Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya. These movements effectively isolated Jordanian forces within the city.
- **Jordanian Order for Withdrawal:** Facing mounting pressure and recognizing the untenable military position, at 11:30 PM the Jordanian King Hussein ordered a full retreat of Jordanian troops from the West Bank. This directive was transmitted to Jordanian units, effectively beginning the withdrawal.

These initial **2 days** were pivotal, leading to significant territorial changes and setting the stage for subsequent diplomatic and military developments in the region.

***Note:** While historically, peace talks between the two blocs did not occur on June 6, 1967, for the purposes of this MUN conference, they will. The conference will be set at 11:40 PM on June 6, 1967, immediately following the order issued at 11:30 PM for Jordanian forces to retreat from the West Bank. Although in real history this order was canceled approximately two hours later, in this simulated setting, it will be up to the delegates to determine the course of action.*

*From 11:40 PM onward, all military actions will cease, with the only exception being the Jordanian retreat from the West Bank—unless the Jordanian delegates decide otherwise. At this pivotal juncture, delegates will have the freedom to explore alternative strategies and negotiate potential pathways to resolve the conflict, unbound by the historical outcomes of the actual Six-Day War.*

*Delegates are expected to be well-versed in the historical events leading up to this moment, but from this point forward, they are encouraged to think creatively and strategically. The conference presents a unique opportunity to reshape history, allowing participants to make decisions that could lead to a lasting peace or further escalation, depending on the diplomatic and tactical choices made during the talks.*

## **Timeline of the Entire Conflict**

**June 5:** Israel initiates airstrikes on Egypt. Later, it targets Jordan and Syria's air forces. In retaliation, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq launch air raids on Haifa, and Jordan attacks Netanya and other Israeli sites. Jordan and Iraq also attempt to strike Tel Aviv, while Jordan begins artillery fire on the city.

**June 6:** Syrian forces strengthen their positions along the Israeli border and start artillery fire. Israel captures Gaza, Ras el Naqeb, and Jebel Libni from Egypt. Key areas

like Ramallah, northeast Jerusalem, Ammunition Hill, and Talpiot fall to Israeli forces. Jordanian troops are ordered to pull back from the West Bank.


June 7: The U.N. Security Council calls for a cease-fire, but Egypt's President Nasser rejects it. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eskol proposes a cease-fire and peace talks to King Hussein of Jordan, but receives no response. Israel takes control of Bir al-Hasna and Al Qazima in Egypt. Jordan loses Jerusalem's Old City, Nablus, and Jericho, and its forces are ordered to retreat. Clashes continue between Israel and Syria along the Golan border.

June 8: Egypt agrees to a cease-fire. The Israeli army captures Hebron, while fighting in the Golan Heights persists.

June 9: Israel orders an attack on the Golan Heights.

June 10: Israel captures Kuneitra and Mas'ada. A cease-fire with Syria is reached, marking the end of the war, with Israel gaining control of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal.

## Useful Maps



<https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/map-of-the-egyptian-front-june-1967>

# Events Leading to the Six Day War (25-30 May, 1967)



<https://www.gov.il/en/pages/events-leading-to-the-six-day-war>



# 1949 Armistice Lines

■ Jordanian occupied   ■ Egyptian occupied   ▤ Armistice lines



<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-54116567>

## **Country and Bloc Positions**

### **Pro-Israel Coalition:**

#### **State of Israel:**

Israel's primary objective during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was to defend itself against the perceived existential threat from surrounding Arab states. The Israeli government aimed to secure its borders by launching a preemptive strike against Egypt, which quickly expanded to other fronts, including Jordan and Syria. Through swift military victories, Israel sought to gain strategic depth, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights, to enhance its national security. Diplomatically, Israel wanted to negotiate peace agreements that would recognize its right to exist and secure defensible borders.

- ***Abba Eban → Foreign Minister***

Abba Eban served as Israel's chief diplomat during the Six-Day War, playing a critical role in presenting Israel's case to the international community. He engaged in intense negotiations at the United Nations and with key global powers, including the United States and France. Eban articulated Israel's justification for preemptive military action, emphasizing the existential threats from neighboring Arab states. His persuasive speeches and diplomatic efforts helped prevent the imposition of international sanctions and garnered broader understanding for Israel's actions.

- ***Moshe Dayan → Defense Minister***

Moshe Dayan, appointed just days before the war, was the strategic mastermind behind Israel's military campaign. He oversaw the swift and coordinated operations on all fronts, including the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Dayan's approach emphasized speed and surprise, which were critical in achieving decisive victories within six days. His leadership not only boosted troop morale but also established him as a national hero and symbol of Israeli resilience.

- ***Yitzhak Rabin → Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)***

As Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin was responsible for planning the military strategy that led to Israel's stunning success. He coordinated the ground, air, and naval operations, ensuring that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were well-prepared and mobilized. Rabin's strategies were key to the capture of Jerusalem and the West Bank, and his leadership solidified his reputation as a capable and strategic military leader, eventually paving the way for his political career.

- ***Mordechai Hod* → *Commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF)***

Mordechai Hod orchestrated Operation Focus, a preemptive strike that destroyed the majority of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground within the first few hours of the war. This operation provided Israel with critical air superiority and significantly reduced the Arab coalition's ability to mount an effective counterattack. Hod's leadership ensured the success of subsequent operations, contributing directly to Israel's rapid and overwhelming victory.

### **United States of America:**

The United States maintained a cautious but supportive stance towards Israel during the war. While the U.S. did not provide direct military aid, it offered diplomatic backing, particularly in the United Nations, and sought to prevent a broader escalation involving the Soviet Union. The U.S. aimed to maintain regional stability, safeguard its interests in the Middle East, and prevent disruptions to oil supplies. Ultimately, American policymakers favored a quick ceasefire and promoted Resolution 242, which advocated for "land for peace" as a basis for long-term stability.

- ***Dean Rusk* → *Secretary of State***

During the Six-Day War, Dean Rusk focused on maintaining diplomatic channels and avoiding direct U.S. military involvement. He advocated for a ceasefire through the United Nations and worked to manage the complex Cold War dynamics, as the Soviet Union supported the Arab states. Rusk also balanced U.S. commitments to Israel with broader strategic interests in the Middle East, promoting a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

- ***Robert McNamara* → *Secretary of Defense***

As Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara was involved in analyzing the military implications of the conflict and advising President Lyndon B. Johnson. He evaluated the potential impact of the war on U.S. military strategy and regional stability. Although the U.S. did not provide direct military support, McNamara contributed to discussions on arms supplies and maintaining a balance of power in the region.

- ***Richard Helms* → *Director of the CIA***

Richard Helms oversaw the collection of intelligence related to the conflict, including assessments of the military capabilities of Israel and the Arab states. The CIA provided crucial information on troop movements and the readiness of Arab militaries, which influenced U.S. diplomatic strategies. Helms' intelligence briefings helped shape the cautious approach taken by the U.S. government during the war.

- **Arthur Goldberg → U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations**

Arthur Goldberg played a key role at the United Nations, advocating for a ceasefire and working on the drafting of Resolution 242. This resolution established the principle of "land for peace," which became a foundation for future peace negotiations. Goldberg's diplomatic efforts aimed to create a balanced framework that addressed both Israeli security needs and Arab demands for territorial withdrawal.

*Note: The fact that the U.S. did not actually provide direct military support to Israel during the Six-Day War does not mean that delegates cannot decide to do otherwise during this conference. To be clear, this comment is not a suggestion; it is just a note to inform you of the possible actions you are free to take, and it applies to all other attending countries as well.*

### **United Kingdom:**

The UK's position during the Six-Day War was characterized by a focus on diplomacy and maintaining its influence in the Middle East. As a former colonial power with historical ties to the region, the UK aimed to remain a key mediator while avoiding direct involvement in the conflict. British officials supported international efforts to broker a ceasefire and participated in drafting UN Security Council Resolution 242. The UK sought a balanced approach, recognizing Israel's security needs while advocating for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories as part of a negotiated settlement.

- **George Brown → Foreign Secretary**

George Brown was involved in the British government's diplomatic response to the war. He engaged with international counterparts to push for a ceasefire and sought to maintain Britain's influence in the Middle East. Brown also played a role in shaping the UK's stance at the United Nations, where Britain supported efforts to end the conflict quickly and promote regional stability.

- **Denis Healey → Secretary of State for Defence**

Denis Healey monitored the military aspects of the conflict and provided assessments of its impact on British and NATO interests. He was involved in discussions about potential British military responses and worked to ensure that British forces in the region were not drawn into the conflict. Healey's focus was on minimizing the risks to British personnel and maintaining a neutral stance while supporting diplomatic solutions.

## **Pro-Arab Coalition:**

### **United Arab Republic (Egypt):**

The United Arab Republic, or Egypt, was the central actor in the Arab coalition during the Six-Day War, driven by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arab ideology and confrontational stance toward Israel. By June 6, 1967—two days into the war and two hours after Jordan's withdrawal—Egypt's military position had collapsed. Israel had destroyed 90% of Egypt's air force in the war's opening hours, captured the Sinai Peninsula, severed Egyptian supply lines, and 15,000 Egyptian soldiers had been killed/captured. The withdrawal of Jordanian forces from the West Bank further destabilized Egypt's eastern flank, leaving its leadership scrambling to avert total defeat.

- ***Mohamed Fawzi → Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces***

Mohamed Fawzi served as Egypt's Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in 1967. He oversaw the military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula following Nasser's mobilization orders and coordinated with Syrian and Jordanian counterparts under the Arab defense pact. Fawzi's strategies focused on fortifying Egyptian positions and preparing for a protracted conflict. However, his overconfidence in Egypt's Soviet-supplied weaponry and failure to anticipate Israel's preemptive strike contributed to the rapid collapse of Egyptian defenses.

- ***Abdul Hakim Amer → Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces***

Abdul Hakim Amer, Egypt's Vice President and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, was a key architect of Egypt's military posture prior to the war. A close ally of Nasser, Amer advocated for the expulsion of UNEF peacekeepers and the closure of the Straits of Tiran. His leadership was marred by poor logistical planning and intelligence failures, including the misplacement of Egyptian aircraft ahead of Israel's Operation Focus. Amer's mismanagement of troop deployments left Sinai forces vulnerable to Israel's devastating air and ground offensives.

- ***Mahmoud Riad → Foreign Minister***

Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad led diplomatic efforts to frame the war as Israeli aggression, rallying Arab and non-aligned nations at the UN. After Jordan's withdrawal on June 6, he scrambled to negotiate a ceasefire, secretly offering to lift the Straits of Tiran blockade in exchange for Israeli territorial concessions. His overtures were rejected by Israel, which demanded unconditional surrender, leaving Egypt diplomatically isolated as Sinai fell under Israeli control.

### **Syrian Arab Republic:**

Syria's primary goal in the Six-Day War was to eliminate Israel and reclaim territories lost in 1948, positioning itself as the leader of Arab resistance. Under its radical Ba'athist regime, Syria intensified cross-border attacks from the Golan Heights in early 1967, using Palestinian guerrilla raids to provoke Israeli retaliation and justify a unified Arab offensive. During the war's first two days (June 5–7), Syria launched artillery barrages into northern Israel but avoided committing ground forces, prioritizing the defense of the Golan Heights. By June 6, as Jordan withdrew, Syria's position was compromised as its Soviet-supplied artillery and bunkers on the Golan were undermanned, and internal divisions between hardline ideologues and pragmatic military leaders paralyzed decision-making.

- ***Salah Jadid → Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces***

As Secretary-General of Syria's Ba'ath Party and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Salah Jadid orchestrated Syria's pre-war strategy of sponsoring Palestinian guerrilla raids from the Golan Heights to provoke Israeli retaliation. During the war's first two days, he dismissed reports of Arab coalition losses as propaganda and refused to deploy ground forces, prioritizing ideological defiance over military coordination with Egypt or Jordan. His rigid stance left Syrian defenses isolated, exacerbating vulnerabilities as Israeli forces massed near the Golan.

- ***Bashir Qabbani → Foreign Minister***

As Syria's chief diplomat during the Six-Day War, Bashir Qabbani was charged with articulating Syria's official position on the international stage. Amid rapidly escalating tensions, Qabbani worked to frame the conflict as one of unwarranted Israeli aggression, advocating at the United Nations and in bilateral discussions with key global powers. He pressed for immediate ceasefire measures and called on the international community to recognize Syria's territorial claims and security concerns. Despite his vigorous efforts to balance Syria's hardline military stance with a plea for diplomatic resolution, the swift Israeli advances on the ground ultimately overshadowed his initiatives, highlighting the profound challenges of aligning military actions with international diplomacy during the crisis.

### **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR):**

During the Six-Day War the USSR primarily sought to increase their influence in the region and to enhance the prestige of their Arab client regimes domestically and in inter-Arab politics. They backed Syria's aggressive stance, including Palestinian attacks from its territory, to strengthen Damascus' pro-Soviet regime and counter U.S.

influence, frequently linking Israeli actions to American imperialism. Thus, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq became reliant on Soviet arms. While officially advocating for de-escalation, Moscow simultaneously encouraged a strong Arab stance against Israel and ensured that its allies remained well-armed.

- ***Dmitrii Chuvakhin*** → ***USSR Ambassador to Israel***

Dmitrii Chuvakhin, the Soviet Ambassador to Tel-Aviv, played a key role in warning about the escalating tensions leading to the Six-Day War. In May 1967, he expressed concerns that the situation was rapidly approaching regional conflict, blaming Western imperialist forces, particularly the CIA, for provoking tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Chuvakhin warned Israeli officials, including Foreign Minister Abba Eban, about the dangers of a conflict, citing troop concentrations along the Syrian border.

- ***Andrei Gromyko*** → ***Foreign Minister***

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister during the Six-Day War in June 1967, was instrumental in shaping the USSR's diplomatic and strategic responses to the conflict. His actions included issuing warnings to Israel and Western nations about the potential consequences of Israeli military actions, particularly regarding troop concentrations along the Syrian border. He led Soviet efforts to push for an immediate ceasefire, fearing that continued fighting could result in a decisive Israeli victory and a strategic loss for Moscow. By June 6, as Jordan suffered heavy losses and King Hussein ordered the withdrawal of his troops from the West Bank, Gromyko was actively engaged in back-channel diplomacy to prevent further territorial losses for Soviet allies.

- ***Marshal Andrei Grechko*** → ***Minister of Defense***

As the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko was responsible for overseeing Soviet military assistance to Egypt and Syria. In the weeks leading up to the war, he assured Egyptian officials that the Soviet Union would continue supplying arms and that Moscow was closely monitoring the situation. On May 28, 1967, he met with Egyptian Defense Minister Shams Badran, reaffirming Soviet support and suggesting that if the conflict escalated into a broader regional war, the USSR would be prepared to act. However, Grechko also understood the risks of direct Soviet intervention and, as the war progressed, he advised caution, knowing that any Soviet military involvement could trigger a larger confrontation with the United States. By the night of June 6, as Jordanian forces began withdrawing under heavy Israeli pressure, Grechko opened discussions on how best to respond, including the possibility of reinforcing Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean as a show of force.

### **Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:**

Jordan, under King Hussein, sought to balance Arab nationalism with pragmatism, but mounting regional pressures and security concerns ultimately pulled the kingdom into the Six-Day War. Despite maintaining discreet diplomatic channels with Israel, Jordan increasingly perceived Israeli military actions as a direct threat—especially following the 1966 Samu Raid, in which Israeli forces attacked a West Bank village, killing 21 Jordanian soldiers. Jordan's decision to enter the war on June 5, 1967, was largely based on false Egyptian reports of early Arab victories, which prompted it to launch artillery barrages into West Jerusalem and move forces into the West Bank. However, within 48 hours, Jordan faced a crushing Israeli counteroffensive. By June 6, as Israeli forces overwhelmed Jordanian positions in Jerusalem and the West Bank, King Hussein ordered a full retreat, marking a devastating blow to Jordan's territorial control and political standing in the Arab world.

- ***Abdullah Salah → Minister of Foreign Affairs***

As Jordan's Foreign Minister in 1967, Abdullah Salah played a crucial role in shaping Jordan's diplomatic stance in the lead-up to the war. With tensions escalating in May, Salah worked to reinforce Jordan's strategic alliances with Egypt and Syria, advocating for Arab unity in the face of perceived Israeli aggression. Despite initial reservations about military engagement, he publicly endorsed the joint defense pact with Egypt, believing that Jordan could not afford to remain neutral. During the war's first two days, Salah engaged in urgent diplomatic outreach at the United Nations, arguing that Israel's attacks on Jordanian territory constituted a violation of international law. However, as Israeli forces rapidly advanced, Salah's focus shifted to securing international support for a ceasefire. His efforts were ultimately overshadowed by Jordan's battlefield losses, and by June 6, he was left to manage the aftermath of Jordan's withdrawal from the West Bank.

- ***Field Marshal Habis Majali → Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces***

Field Marshal Habis Majali was responsible for directing Jordanian military operations during the Six-Day War. With extensive experience dating back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Majali had long advocated for strengthening Jordan's defensive capabilities. When war broke out on June 5, he oversaw Jordan's initial attacks on Israeli positions in West Jerusalem and the West Bank, mistakenly believing that Israel was on the defensive. However, as Israeli forces launched a swift counteroffensive, Jordanian defenses crumbled under heavy bombardment and rapid Israeli advances. By June 6, Majali struggled to coordinate an effective defense, as key Jordanian positions in Jerusalem came under siege. Recognizing



the untenable situation, he advised King Hussein on June 6 that a full withdrawal was necessary to avoid total military collapse, marking Jordan's devastating defeat in the war.

## **Bloc Positions:**

- ***Pro-Israel Bloc (Israel, USA, UK)***

The Pro-Israel Bloc, comprising Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom, adopted a multifaceted approach to the conflict. Israel aimed to secure its borders, neutralize the immediate threats posed by neighboring Arab states, and gain strategic depth to enhance its security. The United States maintained a cautious stance, advocating for a diplomatic resolution while balancing its support for Israel with its broader geopolitical interests in the Middle East. The United Kingdom, while less directly involved, sought to maintain stability in the region and uphold its international influence, supporting diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict. Collectively, the Pro-Israel Bloc aimed to achieve a ceasefire, prevent Soviet intervention, and establish a post-war framework that would ensure Israel's security and promote regional stability.

- ***Pro-Arab Coalition (Egypt, Syria, USSR, Jordan)***

The Pro-Arab Coalition, led by the USSR, Egypt, and Syria, sought to counter Western influence in the Middle East and uphold Arab nationalist aspirations during the Six-Day War. The coalition aimed to defend Arab sovereignty against Israeli "aggression," weaken U.S.-Israeli ties, and solidify Soviet geopolitical dominance in the region. The USSR provided Egypt and Syria with advanced weaponry, military advisors, and diplomatic backing, including vetoing UN resolutions unfavorable to Arab states. The alliance framed the conflict as anti-imperialist, leveraging Arab nationalism to rally global support.

## **Conclusion**

While this background guide is by no means exhaustive on the topic of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, we hope that you will find it useful in beginning with your preparation for ACSMUNC V. We suggest that all delegates do further research and be well acquainted with both the stances and likely actions of the respective individual, nation, and bloc that they will be representing. Finally, we would like you to consider what impact this conflict has had on your country, and what impact your country has had on the conflict.

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