



# ACSMUNC III

## Historical Crisis Committee

**Chairs:**

Denitsa Boykova

Anna Hatchikian

## **Letter From the Chairs**

Dear Delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to this year's ACSMUNC 3. This conference is very special for both of us, as it marks the end of our highschool experience with MUN, while also being the project, with which we will conclude our entire highschool careers.

The topic we have chosen and prepared for this Historical Crisis will present you with the chance to explore an altered version of history, where attempts at peace were made, despite the obstacles, which may have hindered them in the real world. We invite you to immerse yourself in those years and see whether things could have gone in a different direction.

Crises are quite engaging exactly because delegates have the influence to alter the course of history. We are excited to see what decisions you will make and how everything will unfold during the conference.

This being said, we look forward to meeting you all at ACSMUNC 3!

Yours,

Denitsa Boykova & Anna Hatchikian

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## **Context of the Historical Crisis**

On November 25th, 1982 representatives of the Afghanistan government and the Mujahideen, have gathered for a make-believe conference with the intention of negotiating an agreement for the war's end with the USSR and the USA present as potential guarantors and diplomatic support. Participants, however, are in no way restrained to fulfilling the outlined goal. Should discussions prove unfruitful, they will be allowed to take all **realistic** measures in order to sway the situation in their favour. For instance, delegates will be permitted to attempt assassinations and deploy military forces, but efforts at launching an army of genetically modified reptiles would be hindered by the chairs.

## **The Political Situation in Afghanistan**

In the 1970s the already established Soviet influence in Afghanistan was on the rise. A coup organised by former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud in 1973 was backed militarily by the USSR which provided Daoud's army with training and material. The coup was successful in overthrowing King Zahir and establishing Daoud as President.

Initially Daoud enjoyed sufficient support from the Marxist PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan), however, his attempts at reconciling with the US lost him allegiance within the party. On April 28th, 1978 he was killed by members of the Khalq, the more radical of the two factions which had formed within the PDPA. The Khalq leader Noor Taraki then took control of the country, becoming Prime Minister. Babrak Karmal, the leader of the second faction within the PDPA (the Parchamists) became his Deputy in the Revolutionary Council and Hafizullah Amin (long-time supporter of Taraki) became Deputy Head of the Council of Ministers.

Taraki launched a program aimed at spreading the Communist revolution to the Islamic tribes in Afghanistan's countryside which was met with hostility and revolts throughout the country. Taraki and Amin travelled to Moscow to sign a treaty which would grant them military support in the instance that insurgencies become a threat to the regime.

Seeing the unstable situation in the country, the Soviets involved themselves politically for most of 1979, but tried to avoid military intervention. To stabilise the situation, they saw it necessary to remove the more radical Amin from power. Taraki was informed of the plot and agreed, however, having learned about the USSR's intentions, Amin executed Taraki and took over the country. He quickly attempted to lessen Soviet control over Afghanistan by moving to re-establish contact with the USA. Understanding that the situation in Afghanistan was getting out of its control and noting the potential sway in direction, the USSR ordered an invasion and troops marched into the country in late December of 1979. They quickly executed Amin and appointed Babrak Karmal as the Head of State of a Soviet puppet government.

## **The Mujahideen**

Upon taking control in 1978, Nour Taraki and Hafizullah Amin began implementing Soviet-style reforms. Industry was nationalised, rights to land ownership restricted and equal rights were granted to women. From the point of view of Islamic fundamentalists these reforms were set to alter life for the people of Afghanistan, destroy existing tribal structures, and erode tradition. They called for *jihad* or "holy war" against the regime. United under the name *mujahideen* or "soldiers of god" they

would consist of numerous factions which would fight not only against the government but also among each other.

The USA began supporting the Mujahideen through a **covert** operation as early as the summer of 1979. Deciding that it would be against its national interest to support Afghan rebels openly, it launched Operation Cyclone through which it would supply mujahideen groups of its choice with money and Soviet-made weapons through the government of Pakistan. Operation Cyclone began under President Jimmy Carter and peaked during the Ronald Reagan administration reaching \$400 million of yearly funding. Aside from being a funnel for US support Pakistan would also provide funds alongside Iran and China, the UK and others.

After the USSR invasion, Soviet and Afghan forces quickly took control of the cities, however, the mujahideen would dominate in the rural and mountainous areas which they were more familiar with. Their attack style was largely focused on hit-and-run tactics, sabotaging infrastructure, assassinations and strikes on both civilian and military targets. They were not hesitant to use villages as shelter and sites for launching attacks thus directly endangering civilians.

## **Socio-Economic Effects**

Throughout the war approximately 1.2 million civilians were killed, 1.5 million were left physically disabled, 6 million became refugees, and around 2 million people were internally displaced. Production and industrial output declined by 40-60% and material losses in Afghanistan stood at an estimated \$13 billion. Aside from the psychological consequences of the war, the displacement of individuals also hindered

the transfer of skills related to the country's economic activity such as farming, trade, and herding.

The Soviet Union's invasion served as an incentive for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and helped legitimise and promote radical ideas before the public. Thousands of survivors went on to be immersed in extremist teachings and would later join the Taliban. Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left a power vacuum in Afghanistan and set the stage for the Taliban to later overtake the country.

On the Soviet side, the war took approximately 15 000 lives. Some of the perished troops were victim to abduction and torture. The war was also largely unpopular in the Soviet Union contributing to people's growing disillusion with the government. The withdrawal in 1989 discredited the Red Army in the eyes of the public and the overall Soviet loss is seen as a significant contributor to the dissolution of the Union. Internationally, the USSR had earned itself widespread condemnation for having invaded and meddled with the affairs of a sovereign state.

## **Participants**

### **1. Mujahideen**

#### **Gulbuddin Hekmatyar**

A mujahideen leader and founder of the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin. Between 1979 and 1981 his group was considered the most powerful among the mujahideen.

#### **Yunus Khalis**

A mujahideen leader and founder of the Hezb-e Islami Khalis. The second of the two factions which came out of the Hezb-e Islami (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin being the other one). He held a degree in Islamic law and is now known for exerting clandestine influence during the Soviet-Afghan war.

## **Ahmad Shah Massoud**

Also known as the “Lion of Panjshir” was a powerful commander of the Jamiat-i Islami. He was involved in the 1973 coup and later conflicts with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami. He attended Kabul University, but dropped out due to dissatisfaction with his Russian professors and communist peers.

## **Amin Wardak**

At the time still a member of the Mahaz-e Melli. Conducted long-range operations against the Soviets and managed to spread his influence. Criticized factions for focusing on internal power struggles instead of fighting the Soviets.

## **Abdul Haq**

Commander of the Hizb-i Islami Khalis group. Known for defending the use of rockets against Kabul despite the inevitable civilian casualties. He was also an important CIA contact in the early years of the war.

## **Mohammad Zabihullah**

Member of the Jamiat-i Islami and leader in the Balkh Province. He was a religious school teacher before he joined the resistance and would later create schools and encourage literacy classes in his region.

## 2. USA

### **Charles Franklin Dunbar**

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim at the US Embassy in Afghan at the time of the conference. A career diplomat, his previous experience included working as ambassador and consul in the Middle East.

### **George Shultz**

Graduated from Princeton University and earned a PhD in industrial economics from MIT.

Was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989 and advocated less austere policies toward the USSR. Shultz had previously served as Secretary of Labour and Treasury.

### **Arthur A. Hartman**

US ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1981 to 1987. He was the longest-serving US ambassador to the USSR during the Cold War. He was known as “one of the brainiest and most professional members of the Foreign Service.”

### **William P. Clark Jr.**

The United States National Security Advisor, a close friend of Ronald Raegan.

Believed that the USSR could be pushed to a state of collapse due to which he was opposed by George Shultz.

## 3. Afghanistan

### **Babrak Karmal**



A communist and leader of the Parchamists, he was Deputy Prime Minister under Noor Taraki and later. President of the Soviet-installed puppet government from 1979 to 1986. He would be seen as a Soviet puppet throughout his presidency and despite attempted reforms would many times fail to pacify the public

## **Shah Mohammad Dost**

Foreign Minister of Afghanistan and a well-renowned diplomat who would serve as a key figure in the negotiations for the war's end.

## **Mohammad Najibullah**

At the time Minister of State Security and member of the Politburo. He was known for his ruthlessness toward anti-communists and for being strongly favoured by the USSR.

## **Sultan Ali Keshmand**

A member of the Parchamites, he was imprisoned in 1978 and sentenced to 15 years. Under Karmal's rule he was released and later, in 1981, appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers making him one of the most influential politicians in the country.

## **Nur Ahmed Nur**

Member of the Politburo and a Parchami. He was also the former Minister of the Internal Affairs, and a former ambassador to the United States.

## **Abdul Qadir**

An active participant in the 1973 coup, he later became Minister of Defense, but was deposed and imprisoned by Taraki. After the Soviet invasion, he was released and appointed Defence Minister once again in 1982.

## **4. USSR**

### **Andrei Gromyko**

Served as Foreign Minister from 1957 to 1985 and was one of the leading Soviet diplomats and politicians during the Cold War. Was known for his frequent use of the veto in the UN Security Council.

### **Viktor Komplektov**

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1982, he had served as director of the U.S.A. Department of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

### **Anatoly Dobrynin**

Soviet Ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986. A key figure in Soviet-american relations for over two decades, Dobrynin was well liked by the US government and maintained close contact with the Senior Administration.

### **Alexander Puzanov**

Former Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan (1972 - 1979). An experienced diplomat with knowledge of the political situation in Afghanistan prior to the invasion as well as the prerequisites for the mujahideen insurgency.

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